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gunnery and the development of
continuous-aim fire. He begins to
innovate!
Sims forged the Navy in preparation
for World War I with his focus on
naval gunnery, battleship design, and
destroyer operations. Always the rebel
and revolutionary, his insights were
grounded on firsthand knowledge and
experience. Sims was a critical thinker
whose ability to evaluate technologies
and platform designs was matched by
his determination to fight for those
changes required for military readiness. He abhorred risk-averse behavior
and what he termed “military conservatism,” referring to the “dangerous reluctance to accept new ideas.”
From Sims’s perspective, the opportunity for officers to conduct war games
served to enhance the development of
critical thinking skills and innovative
operational solutions. He would enjoy
exploring advanced technologies, such
as drones, networks of autonomous,
unmanned systems, and artificial
intelligence, and would integrate these
technologies into military war-fighting
capabilities. Sims would be the first
to accept and adopt these technologies to gain a military advantage.

vigilant with regard to maintaining
military readiness. While I would not
presume to know how he would handle
each of the military crises in today’s military operational environment, I would
offer that Sims would applaud the Naval
War College’s commitment to excellence
in education and its commitment to developing revolutionary innovative naval
warfare concepts through war gaming.
In conclusion, Sims serves as a model
for all leaders and challenges us to
examine our personal and professional
development. How do we compare in
our dedication to duty, our commitment to discipline and moral courage,
our ability to innovate, and our ability
to challenge ourselves continuously by
learning? One could argue that we need
a young Lieutenant Sims today if we are
to remain a world power. The question
is, Would we recognize a Lieutenant
Sims in the twenty-first-century Navy?
This is a welcome addition to the 21st
Century Foundations series from the
Naval Institute Press, informative,
inspiring, and a must-read for those
interested in leader development. The
bibliography provides further reading recommendations to enhance
the reader’s interest in this topic.

As President of the Naval War College,
Sims exemplified a career dedicated to
the education and development of Navy
leaders. Throughout his career, Sims
emphasized the need for the development of leaders with strong moral
character, who were capable of strategic
thinking and effective decision making.

Kaiser, David. No End Save Victory: How FDR
Led the Nation into War. New York: Basic Books,
2014. 408pp. $28

Sims continues to inspire and challenge
a new generation of Navy leaders. Sims
would remind us that the main objective of the Navy is to prepare for war! He
cautions us to be aware of our own fleet’s
vulnerabilities and tasks us to remain

David Kaiser’s No End Save Victory
stands out as the best of several books
published in 2014 that examine FDR’s
leadership during the interlude between
the fall of France and the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor in December
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1941. In contrast to Lynne Olson’s Those
Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and
America’s Fight over World War II, Susan
Dunn’s 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh,
Hitler—the Election amid the Storm,
and Nicholas Wapshott’s The Sphinx:
Franklin Roosevelt, the Isolationists,
and the Road to World War II, Kaiser
extends his analysis beyond the domestic struggle between Roosevelt and the
isolationists. While his analysis includes
discussions of congressional politics,
neutrality legislation, the America First
Committee, and the election of 1940,
it encompasses additional dimensions
that shaped FDR’s foreign and security
policy ranging from the role of ULTRA
and MAGIC intercepts to naval and
military advice regarding capabilities
and force development. Kaiser presents a
wide-ranging analysis of policy, strategy, capacity, and mobilization during a
period when danger loomed but much
of the public opposed direct military
intervention in the ongoing conflicts
in Europe, China, and the Atlantic.
His cast of individuals and institutions
includes not only the familiar top tier of
figures and committees but the military
planners, labor union bosses, business
leaders, and second tier of executive
officials who translated FDR’s visionary
ideas into tangible plans and policies.
Kaiser is particularly skillful in three
areas. Most strikingly, his narrative does
a marvelous job of capturing the flavor
of FDR’s decision making. While highly
organized individuals such as Secretary
of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief
of Staff George Marshall could be
driven to distraction by the president’s
intuitive—sometimes meandering—
approach to strategy and planning, the
reader gains an understanding of what
Roosevelt was doing. He was exploring
and creating options. He was testing
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ideas and concepts, sometimes dropping
them and sometimes merely pocketing
them for later use at the appropriate
time and place. Kaiser repeatedly points
out how Roosevelt prodded subordinates
to provide him feedback on various
germinating concepts months and
sometimes years before they became
policy, with Lend-Lease, the destroyersfor-bases deal, the occupation of Iceland
and Greenland, and the oil embargo of
Japan among the concepts he examined
discreetly and informally well before he
unveiled his intentions to cabinet members, congressional leaders, and allies.
Second, Kaiser makes clear that FDR
was thinking in terms of victory over
the Axis powers even while Marshall,
Hap Arnold, and others remained
focused on hemispheric defense and
building up American forces in 1939
and 1940. Even before the outbreak of
war in Europe, Roosevelt grasped the
importance of airpower, pushing for a
huge air force “so that we do not need to
have a huge army.” Likewise, the TwoOcean Navy Act passed in the summer
of 1940, providing the U.S. Navy with
the means to mount offensives in the
Pacific even while supporting AngloAmerican amphibious assaults in the
Mediterranean and France in 1943–44.
Lastly, Kaiser takes on the latest generation of literature postulating that FDR
sought to find a “back door to war”
against Germany by implementing an oil
embargo of Japan that he knew would
provoke a Japanese military response.
Kaiser weighs the evidence very carefully, and while he concludes that FDR
was fully aware that implementing the
embargo might lead to war with Japan,
FDR was reacting to MAGIC intercepts
that indicated that the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina
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was designed to prepare the way for the
conquest of Singapore and the Dutch
East Indies. FDR, aware that Japan had
plans for continued expansion, simply did not see why the United States
should supply Japan with the means
for its southward drive. Kaiser puts it
as follows: “The American embargo
did not lead the Japanese to decide on
a southward advance. That decision
had taken place before the American
freeze of Japanese assets” (258).
Kaiser’s work is a must-read for those
interested in strategy, policy, and
the preparation for war. Kaiser rates
Roosevelt’s performance very highly.
While the book lacks a bibliography,
the endnotes confirm that the work
rests on a thorough use of both primary
and secondary sources. Those seeking
to understand how Roosevelt prepared
the United States for a war he viewed as
inevitable will find this book insightful, delightful, and multilayered.
DOUGLAS PEIFER

Fisher, David. Morality and War: Can War Be Just
in the Twenty-First Century? Oxford Univ. Press,
2012. 320pp. $30 (paperback)

David Fisher’s recent book, Morality and
War, offers an account of the philosophical foundations of the just war tradition
that integrates various contemporary
forms of ethics into a new approach
he calls “virtuous consequentialism.”
He argues against moral skeptics and
antifoundationalists, insisting that some
account of the underpinnings of morality must be given if moral prescription
is to maintain its normative force and
not collapse into relativism. For Fisher,
thinkers as diverse as Isaiah Berlin and
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Michael Walzer succumb to a false
dichotomy; the impoverished moral
vocabulary of the twentieth century
forces them to oscillate between two
extremes—an infallible totalitarianism and a groundless liberalism. In this
picture, any attempt to define what is
required for all humans at all times and
everywhere to flourish is seen as the
attempt to subjugate one’s own choices
to an irrationally inerrant worldview,
which in the postmodern age is criticized as feigning objectivity for the
interests of prevailing power structures.
Countering this, Fisher adopts an
Aristotelian approach to moral theory.
Aristotle’s teleology allowed him to
understand the life of virtue as both
necessary for all human flourishing
and pluralistic in its manifold expression. Both the athlete and the artisan
might flourish as human beings just
so long as they possess the virtues,
even if it is understood that courage,
justice, and the rest are expressed in
very different ways between the two;
and a soldier’s courage is the same even
when comparisons are made between
drastically different times and places.
Yet despite this endorsement of Aristotle, Fisher believes that no single
moral theory—Aristotelian virtue ethics,
utilitarianism, deontology—adequately
accounts for the complexity of our
contemporary moral lives. Therefore,
his project combines consequentialism with virtue ethics because he sees
each as having something the other
requires to make sense of contemporary
morality. Fisher argues that to know
what the right thing to do might be in
a given situation we must reflect on
how our actions conduce to human
flourishing but also understand our
actions’ consequences. That is, virtue
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